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Imitation and the Renaissance Sense of the Past: 
The Reception of Erasmus' Ciceronianus 
Eugenio Garin is perhaps the most persuasive spokesman for 
the widely accepted position that a new sense of the past distinguishes 
Italian humanism and the Renaissance in general from the Middle Ages. 
What Garin calls the humanists' "historical-philological attitude"l 
represents their principal contribution to historiography and intellectual 
history. In the Renaissance for the first time men become conscious 
of their remoteness from antiquity and attempt to understand it in its 
own terms. Or, as Myron Gilmore puts it, anachronism begins to become 
a historical concept in the Renaissance. 2 Some scholars contend that 
this new sense of the past, contrary to Meinecke's belief, constitutes 
the beginnings of historicism. 3 And in particular this awareness of 
the otherness of the past develops out of a rediscovery of philological 
method. 
The essence of humanism is most clearly defined by its 
attitude to the civilization of the past. And that attitude 
is not confined to an admiration or a love for antiquity, nor 
to a greater knowledge of antiquity, but consists rather in a 
well marked historical consciousness. The 'barbarians' were 
not barbarous because they had remained ignorant of the classics, 
but because they had failed to understand them as a historical 
phenomenon. The humanists, on the other hand, discovered the 
2 
classics because they managed to detach themselves from them 
and comprehend their Latin without confusing it with their 
own Latin. . . . For this reason one should never seek to 
distinguish between the humanistic discovery of antiquity and 
the humanistic discovery of man -- for they amount to exactly 
the same thing. For the discovery of antiquity implied that 
one had learnt to make a comparison between antiquity and 
oneself, to take a detached view of antiquity and to determine 
one's relation to it .. 
This point of view assumed concrete shape in the critical 
discussion which was started about the documents of the past. 
Such a discussion, whether or not it was to have any specific 
results, made it possible to establish a proper sense of 
distance between the humanists and the past .•.• The 
'philology' of the humanists gave concrete shape to that crisis 
which was occasioned by the new awareness of the past as past, 
by the new vision of reality as something earthly and bv the 
new attempt to explain history as the story of men.4 
A reader who turns from modern enthusiasm for the Renaissance 
discovery of the remoteness of the past to Renaissance philological 
studies and treatises on history will be singularly disappointed: 
theoretical awareness of change and of its significance for 
understanding past and present is very slight indeed. The gap between 
modern claims for the achievements of the humanists and their own 
theoretical pronouncements has led some scholars to explain away the 
absence of explicit statements of the otherness of the past: 
chi voglia ritrovare i caratteri specifici della nuova 
concezione della storia portra dunque avvalersi solo 
limitatamente delle enunciazioni teoriche lasciate dagli 
3 
umanisti, a rischio di non riuscire a cogliere quel 'senso 
della storia' che tuttavia rimane sempre 10 spirito animatore 
dell'Umanesimo e del Rinascimento in genere. 5 
The usual argument runs that this new sense of the past is implicit in 
the philological (and legal) studies of the hurnanists. 6 An 
investigation, however, of one particular branch of Renaissance 
philology, treatises on imitation, calls into question the extent 
and significance of this Renaissance discovery of the remoteness 
of the past. 
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Treatises on imitation are a logical place to look for 
discussions of the relationship of past to present because they are 
concerned with using the writings of the ancients as models for 
contemporary composition. 7 And since they are usually concerned with 
the stylistic possibilities of Latin, they almost always have to 
confront an inescapable fact of historical difference. As the 
humanists are fond of saying, no modern sucks in Latin with his mother's 
milk, as did men in the age of Cicero. But the most compelling reason 
for studying treatises on imitation for the light they throw on Renaissance 
conceptions of history is that one of the most important, Erasmus' 
Ciceronianus, contains a most forceful presentation of the difference 
between antiquity and the present -- a presentation which later 
writers on imitation largely ignore. 
4 
Erasmus' central argument against strict Ciceronianism depends 
0n what one can call historical decorum. Bulephorus, the advocate of 
Erasmian eclecticism and emulation, extracts from Nosoponus, the slavish 
Ciceronian, agreement on the following points. First, Cicero spoke better 
than anyone else. Second, no one deserves the title of Ciceronian, that 
is to say, an excellent speaker, who does not speak like (similiter) 
Cicero. Third, no one speaks well who does not speak with decorum (apte). 
And fourth, we speak with decorum, "if our speech suits the people and 
conditions of the present."S Hence the argument hinges on two propositions: 
good speaking depends on decorum (one of the cornerstones of classical and 
Renaissance rhetoric), and the person who speaks most like Cicero speaks 
best. After establishing agreement on these points, Bulephorus proceeds: 
Does the present situation of this century seem to correspond with 
the ways of those times in which Cicero lived and spoke, since the 
religion, governmental power, magistracies, commonwealth, laws, 
customs, pursuits, the very appearance of men -- really just about 
everything -- have changed radically? ... Furthermore, since every-
where the entire scene of human events has been turned upside down, 
who today can observe decorum in his speech unless he greatly differs 
from Cicero? ••• Wherever I turn, I see everything changed, I stand 
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on another stage, I see another theatre, even another world. 
Therefore a speaker becomes most like Cicero by being different from 
him. Of course, the paradox is only apparent because Cicero redivivus 
would speak differently, especially when treating matters relating to 
the most important difference between his day and the present. 
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res Christianae. When discussing the style of Sadoleto's Commentarius 
in Psalmum L, Bulephorus says: 
He didn't speak like Cicero? No, he didn't. Rather, he did 
because he spoke in the way in which Cicero probably would 
speak, if he were alive, about the same matters, that is, in 
a Christian manner about Christian matters. lO 
Erasmus' objection to strict Ciceronianism rests on his conviction 
that good speaking and writing must accommodate themselves to the changed 
conditions of the world. His historical insight determines his 
position. 
There is good reason to believe that Erasmus regards his 
historical argument as central to the struggle with Ciceronianism. 
A passage from his Life of Jerome, twelve years before the publication 
of the Ciceronianus in 1528, shows that his earliest thinking on 
Ciceronianism centers on the problem of historical decorum. Erasmus 
is defending the style of Jerome against the criticisms of Petrus 
Crinitus: 
Just what is that Roman purity of style? He doesn't speak the 
same way as Caesar and Cicero? But how could it have happened 
that Jerome, speaking about very different matters, would 
nevertheless use the same words? The religion, mode of worship, 
the authorities were different; everything was new. And will 
you say that I am not eloquent unless I speak just as if I were 
living in the age of Cicero, since the principle praise of 
speaking is to observe decorum?ll 
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Here one finds the same conjunction of decorum as a principal element 
of good style with a consciousness of changed conditions of the world. 
Once again decorum is interpreted as accommodating one's style to the 
standards of the times in general, an implicit concern with the widest 
possible audience. 
In his correspondence in the years before the publication of 
the Ciceronianus Erasmus returns to historical decorum as the rhetorical 
justification for rejecting strict Ciceronianism. In a letter to 
Andreas Alciati, which Allen dates 6 May 1526, Erasmus states his point 
briefly: "What,however,could be less decorous, since the whole world 
has been made over -- the religion, governmental powers, magistracies, 
names for places, buildings, fashions, customs -- than not to 
dare to speak differently from Cicero? If Cicero were alive, he would 
laugh at this race of Ciceronians.,,12 Several months later, 30 March 
1527, he writes to John Maldonatus: 
I hear that a new sect, as it were, of Ciceronians has arisen among 
the Italians. I think, that if Cicero were not. living and speaking 
about our religion, he would not say, "May almighty God do this," 
but "May best and greatest Juppiter do this"; nor would he say, 
"May the grace of Jesus Christ assist you," but "May the son of 
best and greatest Juppiter make what you do succeed"; nor would he 
say, "Peter, help the Roman church," but "Romulus, make the Roman 
senate and people prosper." Since the principle virtue of the 
speaker is to speak with decorum, what praise do they deserve who, 
when they speak about the mysteries of our religion, use such 
words as if they were writing in the times of Virgil and Ovid?13 
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l3a Assuming that the text is correct, one must take the second sentence 
as strongly ironic, as Erasmus' constant position is that Cicero 
would treat Christian matters in Christian terms because a master of 
eloquence always suits his expressions to the uses of the times in 
which he finds himself. As in the following sentence from a letter 
to Francis Vergara, 13 October 1527: 
For them it is almost more shameful not to be Ciceronian than 
not to be Christian: as if indeed if Cicero were now alive, he 
wouldn't speak differently about Christian matters than he spoke 
in his day, since the principle part of eloquence is to speak 
with decorum. 14 
These passages show that Erasmus continually resorts to 
the same line of argumentation to refute Ciceronianism in its own 
terms. Even if Erasmus' primary concern in writing the Ciceronianus 
is to expose renascent paganism disguising itself as Ciceronian 
classicism,15 he does not rely on religious appeals. The force of 
his attack comes from his use of the universally accepted criterion 
of decorum; he uses a rhetorical weapon against a rhetorical position. 
Erasmus' historicizing of decorum, his major contribution, to the 
8 
debate over Ciceronianism, opens the way for Estienne Dolet's attack 
on his own position in terms of a more specific conception of decorum. 
But before turning to that attempted refutation, I would like briefly 
to trace other contemporary reactions to this historical aspect of 
the Ciceronianus. Or rather the lack of reaction, for the curious 
thing about the reception of Erasmus' dialogue, from which, as Charles 
Lenient melodramatically put it in 1855, "a universal conflagration 
burned through all of Europe,,,16 is the almost total neglect of the 
historical reasoning which provides the backbone to Erasmus' dialogue. 
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The conflagration which the Ciceronianus kindled raged 
primarily over two issues: the supposed denigration of Cicero, and 
more importantly, the judgments of the Ciceronianism of contemporary 
authors. Lenient and Gambaro have sketched these polemics, of which 
the furor over the comparison of Bude and Josse Bade was the most 
.. 17 
surprLsLng. The polemics provide a melancholy instance of a parergon 
18 
usurping the attention due to the substance of a work. They provide 
a partial explanation of why Erasmus' historical argument is neglected: 
most readers were too incensed with the undervaluation of their own, 
their friends', or their countrymen's style to care to comment on 
other aspects of the work. 
One Italian who did not take offense at the reference to 
himself in the catalogue or at a general libel on Italy wrote Erasmus 
9 
a letter which does not mention the theoretical sections of the 
Ciceronianus. Celio Calcagnini assumes that the catalogue 
of authors is the main point of the dialogue. He expresses his general 
agreement with Erasmus as follows: "Otherwise I strongly approve of 
your judgment in that book: namely that no one after Cicero has 
fulfilled all the asp~ts of eloquence.,,19 From this letter one would not 
realize that the Ciceronianus contains arguments for eclecticism and 
aemulatio, a competitive type of imitation which tries to $urpass 
the model. Calcagnini's response is all the more suprising because 
he and Erasmus are in substantial agreement on the practice of 
imitation. Calcagnini's letter to Giraldi contains the most forceful 
advocation of aemulatio in the Renaissance and includes reasons for 
disagreeing with Giraldi's Ciceronianism. Neither letter, however, 
contains any indication of the significance of the historical 
differences between antiquity and the present. 20 
Nicholas Berauld in 1534 and Francesco Florido in 1539 
defend Erasmus and his advocacy of eclecticism without any reference 
to history or changed conditions .21" The opening of Berauld' s 
Dialogus borrows heavily from the Ciceronianus by making fun 
of Ciceronianism as a new disease. Florido explicitly defends Erasmus 
against Dolet, who attacks Erasmus' conception of decorum, but does 
not consider the historical argument worth mentioning, although in the 
same chapter he shows an acute understanding of the "different periods 
of the Latin language" ("diversa Latinae linguae tempora"). Johann-
Sturm, in 1538, making a case for a moderate'Ciceronianism and frequently 
insisting on the necessity of maintaining decorum, also neglects 
the difference between his day and Cicero's. At one point Sturm 
10 
discusses two types of irtimitabilia, because of nature and because 
22 
of tempora. But by tempora he does not mean historical times; he is 
referring to the different ages of the student. When just beginning, 
a student cannot imitate an advanced author. Later in 1560 Bernardino 
Parthenio, in a lengthy discussion of imitation that almost turns into 
a complete ars rhetorica, fails to give any indications of being aware 
23 
of the changes between antiquity and the present. 
Ramus' Ciceronianus of 1557 provides a more interesting 
example of the neglect of Erasmus' arguments for historical decorum. 
For Ramus does approve using Christian words in Christian contexts: 
"The Christian religion and the form of the state have produced for us 
many things which the ancient Romans never heard of. Our Ciceronian 
24 
will by no means fear to use the names of those things." This looks 
like an enunciation of a historical principle, but the context shows 
that it is not. Ramus' method in his Ciceronianus is to justify a 
program of study from Cicero's own practice. In this passage Ramus 
is approving Cicero's habit of using an obsolete word or expression 
or of adopting a Greek word if an ordinary Latin word is not ready to 
hand. It is worth noting, in addition, that Gabriel Harvey's 
Ciceronianus of 1577, which sings Ramus' praises and adopts several 
of his positions, does not even contain this permission to use 
Christian terminology if the occasion requires. 25 
Before confessing his allegiance to a strict Ciceronian 
standard of style, Jacobus Omphalius, in his De elocutionis imitatione 
ac apparatu of 1537, summarizes three major objections of the 
eclectics. First comes Giovanfrancesco Pico's contention that every 
person has an innate inclination (propensio) to a particular style and that 
11 
an enforced conformity to the style of one author is bound to violate 
this natural disposition in some people. Second, granting such 
preeminence to Cicero amounts to an insult to all the other good 
stylists of antiquity such as Terence and Caesar. Third, Cicero's 
own eclectic practice, his imitating "Demosthenes' force, Plato's 
abundance, Isocrates' charm" in the interminably quoted 
judgment of Quintiltan, argues against following one single model. 26 
Omphalius goes on to quote Poliziano's entire letter to Cortesi. No 
mention of Erasmus, whose De copia receives praise a few pages later, 
or of historical decorum. In fact Omphalius practically denies that 
any change of substance has occurred since Cicero's time. At least 
he asserts that regardless of the legal issue at stake one can almost 
always find appropriate arguments and examples in Cicero. He claims that 
it is partially true that one cannot imitate invention and disposition 
b~cause new, unheard of disputes in civil cases springing 
up require a new disposition, a new collocation of topoi. 
But in my opinion at least, the person who has understood 
and thoroughly studied Cicero's admirable, varied disposition, 
which he has suited to the time, place, and circumstances, 
will not be much bothered about disposition, once he has 
understood the nature of the case. For hardly a topic 
occurs for which one cannot find an example in that greatest 
and most prudent arbitrator of civil disputes. 27 
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Omphalius first admits the existence of cases without precedent; 
then, however, he minimizes their existence by asserting precedents 
in Cicero. The possibility of a really new use is reduced to the 
odd exception: . 28 V1X. 
Bartolomeo Ricci advocates a moderate Ciceronian ism as far 
as style is concerned. His De imitatione, first published in 1541, 
contains a revealing contradiction on the relation of past standards 
to the present. Ricci is defending Senecan tragedy against the 
charge that it violates the Horatian prohibition of onstage violence: 
In this he is not a rash author nor does he violate the 
rules of the theatre. For even if he stages Medea's 
murder of her children and likewise Hercules' children 
pierced by the arrows of their mad father, there are very 
reputable authorities who also allow this in accordance 
with the law of the story, and it is a fact that writers of 
Greek plays did this on their own judgment. But among the 
Romans Horace thought differently. But even if he was right, 
following his own nature and perhaps his times, to recoil 
from the cruelty of these sights, another age has ensued, and 
another mind has been given to writers. Certainly I do Horace 
no injury and make no new rule for myself, if I give my voice to 
the other of the two rules and do not follow his. As if 
indeed even Terence does not sometimes deviate from the 
comedians' rule by introducing, by no means ineptly, into a 
13 
play at some particular moment a good prostitute, a mother-in-
law well disposed to her daughter-in-law, and indeed other 
unusual characters. 29 
The historical insight is almost overwhelmed with evasions. For 
reasons to be discussed later, Ricci seems to be anxious to avoid 
elaborating his point. Rather than basing his case on "another age," 
Ricci offers another law from other authorities and from· the practice of 
Greek dramatists to counteract Horace's. The other law does not 
result from the change in age; consequently Ricci does not even 
really use the historical insight as part of his justification. That 
rests on the existence of two laws and on the example of an approved 
author who departs from a law "by no means ineptly." Ricci does not 
advance beyond authorities, although he gestures towards a historical 
principle that transcends authority. 
In the paragraph before the one I have just quoted Ricci, while 
defending Seneca, appears to allow each age its own stylistic standards. 
He adnits that Seneca's diction is faulty in place3, but that was 
excusable because of his age and country.3D 
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But Ricci is not willing to go as far as Poliziano, who defends silver 
Latinity against charges of degeneracy, "for if we investigate more 
closely, we will realize that eloquehce in the first century was not 
corrupted and depraved, but that the mode of speech had changed.,,3l 
For Ricci,Seneca's departures from the style of the age of Cicero, 
although explainable in terms of his age, are evidence of inferiority; 
for Poliziano the departures are temporal differences. Ricci has the 
sensitivity to Latin style to recognize historical differences, but, 
once again, he only gestures towards a historical principle of judgment 
and refuses to desert classical authority. 
Ricci, in this passage at least, is willing to offer an excuse 
based on aBe. Later in his treatise, however, he denies his own age 
certain privileges granted to antiquity. He approves the coining of 
new words for new things by Cicero and Horace, but moderns must try to 
accommodate the new to the old or resort to periphrasis. One of his 
examples is given by Erasmus as evidence for a new sect of pagans 
disgusted with Christian terminology. For excommunicate, Ricci says, 
one should use sacris or aquis or igne interdicere. If periphrasis 
and accommodation do not suffice, Ricci begrudgingly allows moderns 
to "corrupt" Latin as long as they add the excuse, "as we JIlOderns say. ,,32 
In this discussion it never enters Ricci's mind to follow Erasmus' 
principle of historical decorum by arguing that "another age has 
"ensued."Ricci's treatise ends with a defense of Longueil against 
Erasmus. 
Erasmus' historical argument is not, however, completely 
neglected by writings On imitation. Two works published in 1531, 
15 
closer in time to the Ciceronianus than any work examined so far, do 
echo Erasmus' reasoning. Melanchthon's Elementorum Rhetorices Libri 
Duo is particularly concerned with propriety of language and clarity 
of style. For Melanchtho~ avoiding ambiguity is the primary virtue 
of good writing. He opposes anything that introduces uncertainty, 
and for this reason he attacks allegorical interpretaion of the 
Bible in a long digression. Allegory makes scripture have "nothing 
certain" ("nihil certi"): "This method of interpretation greatly 
d · h h' f h . ,,33 mn ermlnes t e aut orlty 0 t e scrlpture. One must approach 
Melanchthon's historical observation from the context of his 
obsession with the dangers of uncertainty: 
One must avoid strangeness in speech, and in no way may we allow 
ourselves that license of coining new words, which they use 
immoderately in the schools. And yet sometimes one must use 
strange words. There is now another form of government and 
another religion than in Cicero's day. On account of the novelty 
of things, therefore, it is occasionally appropriate to use new 
words -- words which nevertheless usage has made less jarring, 
34 
as judgment, meaning, and the norm of speech depend on usage. 
One uses these strange words to avoid obscurity, not out of a strong 
conviction that one must adopt one's modes of speech to the standards 
of one's times. Later in the treatise, in the section entitled "de 
imitacione," Melanchthon makes this clearer. Those who use persuasio 
l6 
for fides or coelestis philosophia for evangelium are rightly 
ridiculed, since they are only creating unnecessary difficulties 
of interpretation (sig. g iiii). 
Although Melanchthon does not mention Erasmus in 
connection with the use of Christian terminology (Erasmus is 
praised for the De copia and his knowledge of rhetoric), he is 
quite probably alluding to the Ciceronianus with "the fools deserve 
to be ridiculed.,,35 In 1531 the ridicule which Erasmus heaps on 
persuasio for fides must have been fresh in the minds of people 
interested in the Ciceronian controversy. In any event the other 
reference in 1531 to imitation and changes in history is a direct 
acknowledgment of Erasmus' argument: 
As Erasmus excellently sums it up, all things have been changed. 
As a result one cannot speak with decorum about things of 
the present if one does not dare to deviate a hair's breadth 
from Cicero. 36 
Vives' entire conception of imitation is very close to Erasmus'. Both 
insist upon the insufficiency of mere imitation and advocate striving 
with the model, aemulatio. Both insist on historical decorum. And 
Vives offers the fairest assessment of the Ciceronianus: even though 
he was "slighted" in the first edition by not being included in the 
1 f . 37 cata ogue 0 contemporary wrlters. From his approbation one would 
think Vives fully subscribes to Erasmus' notion of historically 
17 
decorous imitatio~ a passage which I shall quote later, however, 
qualifies Vives' conception of historical change. 
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The two remaining responses which I wish to consider help to 
explain why, with the exception of Vives and to a certain extent 
Melanchthon, writers on imitation do not take Erasmus' arguments for 
historical decorum very seriously. I have already suggested that part 
of the reason for the~neglect of this aspect of Erasmus' dialogue is 
that many people considered the judgments on the style of contemporary 
authors to be the heart of the dialogue. The polemical passions which 
the catalogue, a parergon as Erasmus later claims, roused diverted 
attention from Erasmus' statement of his case for eclectic aemulatio. 
The replies by Giulio Camillo Delminio and Estienne Dolet, however, 
raise actual difficulties with the position Erasmus takes. 
The language of Delminio's "Della imitazione," which Weinberg 
dates around 1530, is nearly as importan.t as any argument that it 
advances. Unlike the other treatises examined so far (except for 
Parthenio's), it is written in a vulgar language, Italian, rather than 
Latin. Delminio's main insight seems very obvious, but he draws 
18 
important consequences from it. Latin is no longer spoken; it has 
already finished its development. Delminio begins his essay by 
exhorting Erasmus to stop joking and to resume his real opinion; he 
claims he does not believe that Erasmus is really attacking 
Ciceronianism. Then comes the first argument: 
So then I think that when you are willing to resume your 
true self, you will say, and much better than I can, that 
the Latin language, just like all other things in the 
world, has had its rising, its midday, and its setting. 
And just as one cannot deny that the sun has greater 
power and more apparent beauty at noon than when it 
rises or sets, we should firmly believe that all things 
which begin to exist, reach their zenith after a time, 
and finally set, are more perfect at their zenith than in 
the beginning or their decline. 38 
The organic metaphor of rise and fall allows Delminio to maintain that 
one should resort only to the zenith of Latin, since Latin has run its 
course. After reading Delminio, one realize~ that Erasmus' 
whole approach to the question of the best style rests on the assumption 
that Latin is a living language with as much adaptive power as a vulgar 
tongue, although Erasmus does admit that the opportunities for using 
spoken Latin have been greatly reduced. His accommodation to present 
conditions is open to the charge that Latin is no longer a condition 
of the present. The logical extension of his argument for historical 
decorum is not that Cicero redivivus would use a Latin updated by 
Christian modifications and additions, but rather would speak Tuscan 
or Frenell or Dutch or some other vulgar language. 
19 
Erasmus' historical insight does not see far enough. He 
does not draw the conclusion that part of the "everything is new" of his 
day is the shift from Latin to the vulgar languages. He wants to 
allow his contemporaries to treat Latin as if they were native speakers. 
But the historical situation is radically different. As Delminio says, 
although the opponents of imitation are not speakers of Latin, they 
take the liberty of coining new words because men in Cicero's day, 
while Latin was in use and developing, allowed themselves that liberty. 
"Wouldn't you laugh, Frenchmen, if I, a foreigner, wanted to add 
39 
words to your language?" 
Although Delminio does argue that his contemporaries must 
respect the completed historical development of Latin, he does not 
advocate abandoning Latin for the vernacular. He does allow one to 
see, however, the contradictory tension in Erasmus' championing 
stylistic innovation in a language no longer spoken. Delminio's own 
position does not reject Latin, but builds a different argument from 
decorum on the base of his awareness of the historical situation of 
Latin. Delminio contends that one violates decorum by mixing words 
from different periods of Latin. Since Latin is no longer developing, 
one ignores history when one employs words and constructions from 
different periods as if they all belonged together. Delminio's 
20 
expression of the principle of decorum is implicit in the analogy he 
uses to emphasize the unnaturalness of disregarding the periods of 
Latin usage. He recalls watching an anatomist dissolve the flesh 
from a corpse in order to reveal the skeletal and nervous systems: 
And just as it would displease the eye to see the head 
of such a body clothed with the flesh and skin of a young 
man, but the neck with the flesh and skin, all full of 
wrinkles, of an old man, and still more displeasing if in 
one part there were the virile flesh and skin of a male, 
in another the soft flesh and skin of a woman, and even 
more displeasing if the body had an arm of human flesh and 
the chest of the flesh of an ox or a lion, and was not all 
equal and such as it should be in its most flourishing age, 
likewise it would not please the ear and intellect to hear 
and understand a speech which did not have all its parts 
clothed with one language and was not all suited to itself, 
and which could not belong to one century.40 
This grotesque vision is predicated on the death of the body and the 
death of Latin. It offers another conception of what historical 
decorum might be and thereby undercuts Erasmus' own conception and 
suggests why it does not find acceptance in the later literature on 
imitation. Erasmus' historical argument for a certain kind of 
imitation in Latin contains the seeds of an argument against using 
Latin at all. 
Estienne Dolet, in his Dialogus, De imitatione Ciceroniana, 
adversus Desiderium Erasmum Roterdamum, pro Christophoro Longolio 
21 
of 1535, counters Erasmus' conception of historical decorum by 
emphasizing the importance of audience for decorum. One cannot tell 
if Dolet regards historical decorum as a crucial element in the 
Ciceronianus because his method in his own dialogue is to insert long 
verbatim passages from Erasmus into the mouth of Sir Thomas More, who 
is supposedly defending Erasmus. As a consequence every section of 
the Ciceronianus is discussed in some detail. Nevertheless Dolet's 
position deserves serious consideration, although even the fairest 
and most ,t!horongh student of imitation, Hermann Gmelin, claims that 
41 Dolet does not rise above the level of personal abuse. 
Dolet tackles Erasmus on decorum in two different places, 
once specifically with regard to Longueil's speeches in Rome and once 
in general in the context of Erasmus' discussion of the "totally new 
scene of human affairs." Bulephorus attacks the decorum of Longueil's 
speeches after expressing the admiration he once felt for them. Dolet 
reproduces the major objection. LoTtg;leil'o speeches ha,,-e lTcry ~ittle 
of Cicero :tn therr because 0"' thc ch:cnf,e in tin~es. Cicero o::,o;':e ~ .. ith 
complete decorum, since the senate, tribunes and other political 
institutions were facts of life. Since they no longer exist, Longueil 
hardly can have spoken with decorum. 42 
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To Erasmus' implicit definition of decorum as accommodation 
to the historical conditions existing at the moment in which a speech 
is delivered Dolet offers an explicit, more conventional definition of 
decorum, which centers on the matter at hand. One must follow the 
case closely and say those things which fit the case. 43 Dolet is 
concerned with the individual instance, the primary concern of Cicero's 
own discussion of decorum: 
One kind of speech does not suit every case, audience, 
person, or time, for cases involving someone's rights as 
a citizen require a certain style, and cases dealing with 
private or small matters require another style. 44 
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Erasmus' and Dolet's quarrel over decorum comes down to different 
understandings of "tempori congruere" or as Cicero elsewhere defines 
decorum, "to be appropriate to time and person. ,.45 They both believe 
"tempori congruere" essential for good speaking and writing, but 
Erasmus takes tempus in the general sense of the times or epoch in 
which one finds oneself, while Dolet takes it as the specific 
occasions of the speech. Dolet is closer to Cicero's own under-
standing of "tempori congruere": "The time makes a difference 
whether one of peace or war, of haste or of leisure.,,46 
Since Dolet has his eyes on the circumstances of the 
particular occasion of the delivery of a speech, he pays close 
attention to another aspect of the traditional conception of decorum 
-- the audience. As Cicero states in Orator 71, "decorum 
depends on the people, both those who speak and those who listen.,,47 
Dolet's defense of Longueil's Roman speeches depends on the learned 
audience for which they were composed, although he also argues that 
terms like senatus still make sense because modifications of what 
they represented for the Romans still exist. But the audience is 
his most persuasive point: 
Longueil was rightly able to use words of this sort, not 
in the presence of the ignorant multitude and the dregs of the 
plebs, but when his listeners were very learned and erudite 
men who certainly were not ignorant of those ancient words. 48 
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Not only does the learned audience understand the Roman terms to which 
Erasmus objects -- therefore Erasmus cannot complain of obscurity 
the audience requires them. If Longueil had abstained from those 
terms, which glorify the ancient and flatter the modern Romans, he 
would have exposed himself to the charge of detracting from the glory 
of Rome -- the very charge against which he was defending himself in 
the speeches under consideration. Longueil was trying to ward off 
invidia and adopted Ciceronian diction, "to adapt his speech 
to the pursuits and pleasure of men who still dream that Rome " 
is the ruler of the world. 49 ,// In other words 
Longueil was merely following the time-honored rhetorical principle 
of captatio benevolentiae; he wanted to dispose his audience favorably 
towards him. 
Dolet's response to Erasmus' assertion that the totally new 
conditions of the modern world make an adherence to Ciceronianism a 
ridiculous superstition is again most persuasive when he resorts to 
decorum as accommodation to one's audience. He reproduces the 
"I see that everything has been changed" passage, which proceeds to 
describe an occasion on which one has to give a talk on Christian 
duties and principles to an audience composed of people of all kinds, 
including women. Since Cicero was not familiar with the praise of 
fasting, the utility of charitable works, and similar matters, his 
eloquence will be of no use: he is not familiar with either the things 
or the words for them. 50 
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Dolet's reply is simple. It makes no difference if a 
speaker to such an audience uses the purest Ciceronian Latin or 
intersperses his speech with all the ecclesiastical terms of 
Christian Latin because the audience does not understand Latin 
of any sort. But on the other hand, if one is speaking to a learned 
assembly and substitutes sacra concio for ecclesia or uses any of 
the other expressions which Erasmus ridicules, 
will one any the less teach, delight, or move his learned 
listeners? They will know that the words are not used 
literally and will say they are beautifully figurative; 
they will praise the allusions and admire a speech so finely 
ornamented and illuminated. 5l 
Besides exposing Erasmus' neglect of the particular conditions of a 
speaker's audience, Dolet's criticism reveals the literalism of 
Erasmus' idea of diction. What Erasmus regards as obscure 
anachronisms reeking of paganism, Dolet considers charming metaphors 
and allusions. 
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Decorum is a double-edged concept not only with respect to tempus. 
An indecorous word or expression, when viewed literally, may become 
decorous when viewed figuratively. Erasmus' conception of 
historical decorum disguises the profoundly nonhistorical, 
nontemporal desire to fix the temporal flux of language, one 
manifestation of the incessant possible alternation between literal 
and figurative. Erasmus is trying to impose a literal and temporal 
stability onto the highly unstable play between literal and figurative. 
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Three reasons for the neglect of Erasmus' contention that 
the modern writer who aspires to the title Ciceronian or excellent 
stylist must be unlike Cicero because of the profound changes in the 
world between the Roman Republic and the present, since the primary 
virtue of good writing is maintaining decorum -- what I have been 
calling the argument from historical decorum -- have emerged from 
this study. First, the distraction from the theoretical parts of 
the Ciceronianus which the judgments on the Ciceronian styles of 
Erasmus' contemporaries caused. Second, the internal contradiction 
between erecting adaptation to the demands of the present as the 
central standard for good style and ignoring the volgari as the 
languages of the present. And third, the presentation of a 
generalized conception of decorum which fails to analyze the 
situation of the audience for which a speech or writing is composed. 
The second of these reasons is probably the most important 
and in a sense includes the third, for failure to consider the 
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situation of the audience can amount to failure to analyze the 
linguistic demands of the present. Dolet's more general discussion 
of decorum relies on the ignorance of Latin by a certain class of 
contemporaries. The importance of the internal contradiction lies 
in its ability to undermine a major premise of most writings on 
Ciceronian imitation. Most authors can agree that they are pursuing 
the optimum genus dicendi; without making it explicit they assume 
that optimum means Latin. But the form of Erasmus' argument provides 
a weapon to prove that the best type of speaking and writing must not 
be Latin. Erasmus does not see the potential subversiveness of 
constructing an anti-Ciceronian argument on the historical insight, 
"uideo mutata amnia." 
The Ciceronian controversy and other discussions of imitation 
~orm part of a larger issue, the sense of the past and of its relation 
to the present. At stake, for the men of the Renaissance, is the 
exemplarity of the past and the uses to which it can be put in the 
present. Not only does Erasmus' insight threaten the continuance of 
Latin as the language of eloquence, it tends to subvert a major Renaissance 
faith in history as philosophy teaching through example. From Petrarch 
to Valla to Poliziano to Robortello and Bodin, to mention only a few 
typical and important thinkers, history receives its justification in 
terms of the examples which it provides for conduct in and of the world.52 
History's dignity resides in its more moving and effective exhortation 
to right action. History is the best way, besides a long life full of 
experience, to develop the faculty of prudence. 
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If everything has changed since antiquity, what relevance 
does it have for the present? What becomes of the exemplarity of the 
past? Questions like these reveal the dangers inherent in historical 
decorum. Unless the insight into the otherness of the past is 
repressed or domesticated, it undermines the common Renaissance 
defense of historiography. Since historical decorum is difficult to 
accommodate within traditional conceptions of imitation and history, 
it is not so surprising that it appears so infrequently. Even those 
willing to entertain historical decorum seem uneasy with it. I have 
already pointed to Ricci's tentative and contradictory assertion of 
different standards for different periods because of changes in taste 
and society. Vives offers a much better example because he is the 
only writer, to my knowledge, who embraces Erasmus' statement of 
historical change: "Res omnes, sicut praeclare Erasmus colligit, sunt 
mutatae." Elsewhere in De disciplinis one sees the dangers of 
"mutata omnia" and Vives' response. The passage appears in a 
discussion of prudence and history which contains most of the 
Renaissance commonplaces on historiography. 
Nevertheless there are those who persuade themselves that 
the study of the past is useless because the whole way of 
living, dressing, lodging, waging war, and administering 
peoples and states has changed. That this opinion is 
opposed to the judgment of wise men is a great argument 
that it is also contrary to reason. To be sure, no one can 
deny that all those things have been changed and are being 
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changed daily -- of course, those things which are subject 
to our will and industry. But nevertheless those things 
which are contained in human nature are never changed, that 
is to say, the causes of our mental emotions and their actions 
and effects. They are much more profitable to know than the 
manner in which the ancients built or dressed. For what 
practical wisdom is greater than to know from which things the 
emotions of men are excited or calmed? • Those very things 
which are agreed to have been changed, how many benefits do 
they provide? -- either so that you can make use of something 
yourself, or so that you can understand the reason why something 
was done that way at that tim~ from which knowledge you could 
apply the same or similar method to your own actions, should 
the situation allow. For nothing from the ancients is so out 
of use and abolished that it cannot to a certain extent be 
adapted to our customs of living because even if the form is 
now different, nevertheless the use remains the same, as will 
be easy to grasp for one who examines individual cases. 53 
Vives' uneasiness with these asserters of radical change appears in 
his first reaction; he resorts to the authority of the sapientes 
before attempting his refutation. The past turns out not to be so 
different after all. Only fashions have changed; the important aspects 
of human nature have remained constant. The end of the passage claims 
that even those things which have changed are not too altered to lose 
their utility for us. For Vives, when a historical awareness of the 
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difference between present and past threatens to subvert the 
examplarity of history, the past loses some of its difference, 
not its exemplarity. The confrontation of a nascent historicist 
view of the past with the traditional humanistic belief in the 
utility of history, here in Vives, helps to explain why the 
Renaissance discovery of the otherness of antiquity receives so 
little explicit formulation: the discovery calls into question 
the whole system of Renaissance beliefs based on the purposes of 
history and imitation. 
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nequeat, qui a Cicerone latum unguem deflectere non audet." 
37. "Erasmus librum justum de eo ipso [disease of Ciceronianism] 
scripsit iniquitatepdiciorum permotus, in quo multa congessit 
acute conquisita, qui etsi nonnumquam argutatur magis, quam 
argumentatur, et ludit potius quam pugnat, nempe ex scripti 
ill ius ratione, nam dialogo rem persequitur, habet tamen, 
quantum ad hoc attinet, justam et piam querelam indignationis, 
multisque bonis ac fortibus argumentis praeliatur, quae quia 
nota sunt omnibus, etenim liber est in manibus, nos in praesens 
praetermittemus" (VI, 174). 
38. Weinberg, I, 162: "Posso pensar, adunque, che quando tu vorrai 
ripig1iar la vera persona tua, dirai, e molto meglio di me, che 
, 
1a lingua latina, si come tutte Ie altre cose del mondo, ha 
\ , 
avuto i1 suo oriente, il suo mezzodi et il suo occaso. E si 
, .' come non si puo negar che'l sol non abbia maggior virtu e plU 
aperta bellezza a mezzogiorno che quando leva 0 quando cade, 
cosi ci convien per fermo tener che tutte Ie cose che ad esser 
cominciano, e dopo alcun tempo vengono al lora colma e finalement 
cadono, sian pi~ perfette nel colma che nel cominciamento 0 nella 
declinazione. " 
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39. "Non ridereste voi, Galli, se io straniero volessi aggiunger 
vocaboli alIa vostra lingua?" (1,171) 
lfe'. to E cosi come all' occhio dispiacerebbe veder che' 1 capo d' un 
tal corpo fusse vestito di carne e di pelle di giovane, rna 
il collo di carne e di pelle di vecchio tutta piena di rughe, 
e piu ancor se in una parte fusse di carne e di pelle di maschio 
tutta virile, in un'altra di femina tutta molle, e maggiormente 
se avesse il braccio di carne pertinente all 'uomo et il petto 
di quella che si richiede al bue 0 vero al leone, e non fusse 
tutta equabile equal doverebbe esser nella sua piu fiorita 
eta, cosl sarebbe ingrato all'orecchio et all'intelletto 
l'udir e l'intender una orazion che non avesse tutte Ie parti 
vestite d'una lingua, e non fusse tutta a se medesima conforme, 
e che non potesse esser richiamata ad un secol;' (I, 184). 
41. Gmelin, p. 329. Usually Dolet is coupled with Julius Caesar 
Scaliger (Oratio pro M. Tullio Cicerone contra Des. Erasmum 
Roterodamum [Paris, 1531); a second, more scurrilous oratio 
followed in 1537) in order to dismiss both as slanderous ruffians. 
Telle (see next note) is an exception. 
42. Emile V. Telle, L'Erasmianus sive Ciceronianus d'Etienne Dolet 
(1535) (Geneve: Droz, 1974), p. 27: "Eae [orationesl tamen tot 
annis elaboratae, toties sub incudem reuocatae, toties criticorum 
censuram perpessae, quantulum habent Ciceronis? non quidem 
Longolij culpa, sed temporum. Aptissime dicebat Cicero, uix apte 
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Longolius, quandoquidem Romae nec patres conscripti sunt hodie, 
nec senatus, nec populi autoritas, nec tribuum suffragia, nec 
magistratus, nec leges, nec comitia, nec actionum forma, nec 
municipia, nec prouinciae, socij, ciues: Postremo Roma noua, 
Roma non est. " 
43. "Apte scilicet dicere, hoc non ipsum est causae seruire, causae 
propria dicere ••• denique in ijs singulatim prudenter uersari, 
quae causae susceptae congruant, quaeque nos iuuent maxime, 
non argumento repugnent, aut per inertiam nostram aduersentur" 
(pp. 28-9). 
44. "non omui causae nec auditori neque personae neque tempori 
congruere orationis unum genus; nam et causae capitis alium 
quendam verborum sonum requirunt, alium rerum privatarum atque 
parvarum •.. "(De oratore 3.210-1). 
45. "aptum esse consentaneumque tempori et personae" (Orator 74). 
46. "Refert ••• tempus, pacis an belli, festinationis an oti" 
(De oratorc 3.211). 
47. "quid deceat ..• positum est et in personis et eorum qui dicunt 
et eorum qui audiunt." Compare De oratore 3.211: "Refert etiam 
qui audiant, senatus an populus an iudices: frequentes an pauci 
an singuli, et quales." 
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48. "Vocibus huiusmodi Longolius recte uti potuit, non apud imperitam 
muititudinem & plebis fecem, sed audientibus doctissimis 
eruditissimisque uiris, antiquorum istorum uerborum non 
49. 
ignaris" (pp. 29-30). 
" •• ut orationem ad hominum studia & uo1uptatem accommodarit, 
qui adhuc Roman rerum dominam & et suorum magistratuum ordine 
eff10rescentem somniant" (p. 30). 
50. See Dolet, pp. 176-7, which reproduces with insignificant changes 
Ciceroniano, pp. 126-8 • 
51. " • • an doctos audientes, minus aut docebit, aut ob1ectabit, 
aut commouebit? Verba propria non esse scient & pu1chre 
trans lata dicent, a1lusiones 1audabunt, remque tam eximijs 
uerborum ornamentis i1lustratam i1luminatamque mirabuntur" (p. 180). 
52. See Petrarch's remark at the beginning of De Viris illustribus: 
"Hie enim, nisi fallor. fructuosus historici finis est, i11a 
prosequi que vel sectanda legentibus vel fugienda sunt, ut in 
utranque part em copia suppetat i1lustrium exemplorum," quoted by 
Eckhard Kessler, Theoretiker humanistischer Geschichtsschreibung: 
Nachdruck exemplarischer Texte aus dem 16. Jahrhundert (Munchen: 
Fink, 1971), p. 8. Valla's proem to De rebus a Ferdinando gestis 
reverses Aristotle's judgment of the superiority of philosophy and 
poetry over history by insisting on the superior persuasive powers 
of the examples of history. Poliziano begins his Praefatio in 
Suetonii expositionem with a discussion of the exemplarity of 
history. Robortello. De historica facultate disputatio, 
praises history for making men prudent and repeats the comparison 
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of philosophy and history in favor of the aore persuasive examples 
of history. Bodin, in his Methodus, bases the attempt to find 
universal la,-,'s for government on the exemplarity of history. 
Kessler's introduction to his collection of sixteenth-century artes 
historicae defends the humdnist concern with exemplarity and Ci Iff",r", ' " 
"The Renaissance Conception of the LessDns of Hislory" is a finc 
discussion of history as philosophy teaching through exampl~. 
Opera omnia, VI, 389-90: "Sunt tamen qui veteris memoriae cognitionem 
inutilem esse sibi persuadeant, quod mutata sit universa ratio victus, 
cultus, habitandi, gerendi bella, administrandi populos, et civitates; 
quae opinio, quoniam adversatur sapientum hominum sentenciae, magnum 
sit argumentum et rationi esse contrariam; nimirum, negare nemo 
potest omnia ilIa esse mutata, et mutari quotidie, nempe quae sunt 
voluntatis nostrae atque industriae; sed ilIa tamen nunquam mutantur 
quae natura continentur, nempe causae affectuum animi, eorumque 
actiones et effecta, quod est longe conducibilius cognoscere, quam 
quomodo olim vel aedificabant, vel vestiebant homines antiqui, quae 
enim major est prudentia, quam scire quibus ex rebus qui hominum 
affectus vel concitantur, vel sedantur? ... ilIa ipsa, qua~ 
mutata esse constat, quanta emolumenta suppeditant, vel ut aliquid 
in tuum usum revoces, vel ut causam intelligas cur quidquam tum 
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sic agebatur, quo eandem ipsam aut similem rationem ad actiones 
tuas, quum res feret, applices? nihil est enim veterum adeo desuetum 
et abolitum, quod nostris vivendi moribus accommodari quadamtenus 
non queat; nam etsi forma jam alia, usus tamen idem manet, quod 
eunti per singula facile erit deprehendere." 
